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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

)

Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

)

JAMES RONALD BELLO,
Defendant/Appellant.

)
)
)

Case No. 920830 CA
Priority No. 2

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction for Possession of a Controlled
Substance, a second degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(i)
(Supp. 1991). This Court obtains jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Whether the district court's factual findings and conclusions of law are

insufficiently detail to address all relevant issues. This issue is reviewed under the clearly
erroneous standard. State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
2.

Whether the initial traffic stop of defendant's vehicle was a pretext for

an investigation into matters unrelated to the stop. This is a question of law reviewed for
correctness. State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990).
3.

Whether the officer was justified in further detaining and questioning

defendant after determining that he was not intoxicated and that his vehicle temporarily
weaved out of lanes because of high canyon winds. This is a question of law reviewed for
correctness. State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
4.

Whether the warrantless vehicle search conducted in the instant case

violated the Utah Constitution, which independently mandate that a search be preceded
by both reasonable suspicion and exigent circumstances. This is a question of law reviewed
under the correction of error standard. State v. Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 26 (S.
Ct. 1993); State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990); State v. Naisbitt 827 P.2d 969 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992); State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
5.

Whether defendant's consent, if any, was invalid because it was

involuntary and insufficiently attenuated from the illegal, pretextual stop. This is a mixed
question of law and fact requiring correctness standard of review for the district court's
-2-

ultimate conclusion and clearly erroneous standard of review for its factual findings. State
v. Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 26 (S. Ct. 1993).
6.

Whether the search conducted by the officer exceeded the scope of

defendant's consent. This is a question of law reviewed for correctness. State v. Marshall
791 P.2d 880 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990).
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
United States Constitution, Amendment IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.
Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 14:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated;
and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person
or thing to be seized.

-3-

Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(i):
It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or
to use a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid
prescription or order or directly from a practitioner while acting in the course
of his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this subsection.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The defendant-appellant, James Ronald Bello ("Bello"), was charged by
Information on March 5, 1991, with a one-count second degree felony of possession of
marijuana, a violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(i) (Supp. 1991) (R.l).
Thereafter, Bello filed a motion to suppress evidence seized from him as a result of the
warrantless search of his vehicle (R.25). A hearing was held June 24, 1991, and the motion
was eventually denied March 10, 1992. See Transcript of Motion to Reconsider, 3/10/92,
at 10-11.1
On April 29, 1992, pursuant to stipulated facts, the matter was then tried
before the district court. After denying his motion to suppress, the court found Bello guilty
as charged (Tr. 12-13).2 On November 24, 1992, upon a finding of good cause under
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-402 (Supp. 1992), the court granted a one-degree reduction

1

Bello's petition to this Court for permission to interlocutorily appeal the district
court's decision was denied on April 21, 1992, as being untimely filed. See Addendum III
in this Brief.
2

"Tr." is transcript of stipulated facts trial, R.315.
-4-

of the charge and sentenced Bello to a prison term of zero to five years. The sentence,
however, was stayed pending appeal (R.216; 218-219).^
Subsequently, on November 25, 1992, Bello filed a notice of appeal with the
court below (R.206). There are no prior or related appeals in this matter.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On March 5th, 1991, at approximately 11:15 a.m., Officer Phil Barney
("Barney") observed Bello's eastbound pickup truck temporarily straddling the lane marker
dividing the inside and outside eastbound lanes of traffic.4 He followed the vehicle for
approximately two miles, during which time he observed no other unusual driving pattern
(Mtr.30; Order, Findings of Fact KH 2-3).5 At that time, Barney decided to pull the truck
over (Mtr.28), even though he acknowledged that the extreme wind conditions present that
day could have been the reason for the temporary straddling of the lanes. However, he
indicated that he just wanted to check it out (Mtr. 10-11, 27).
Barney then approached the truck, which had California plates, and
demanded a driver's license and registration, both of which Bello readily produced (Mtr. 10-

3

See Judgment, R.218, attached as Addendum II.

4

Motion to Suppress Transcript, 6/24/91, is R.222, hereinafter "Mtr.," at 8. The
entire episode of the stop was videotaped by Barney. See Exhibits included in the record
in this case.
5

"Order" is R.71, and attached to this Brief as Addendum L
-5-

II). 6 When Barney noted that the truck was registered to someone other than Bello, Bello
explained that the owner of the truck was his boss in California (Mtr.l 1). It was apparently
at about this point that Barney started getting "faint whiffs" of marijuana. He also observed
that Bello appeared to be nervous and shaky (Mtr.ll).
Barney then went to his vehicle and asked the dispatcher to verily if Bello had
outstanding warrants (Mtr.12, 34). The information provided Barney by Bello was verified
as accurate by the dispatcher (Mtr.13, 34).7 Barney returned to the truck and asked if
Bello was carrying firearms and/or narcotics (Mtr.14).8 When Bello responded "no,"
Barney asked him to step out of the truck so he could conduct a search (Mtr.14, 45).
Barney then got inside the vehicle and exited a moment later. Thereafter, Barney patted
Bello down and asked him where he was going (Mtr.15). Bello said he was going to Aspen,
Colorado, to ski and visit his girlfriend. Barney then went to the back of the truck and
attempted to open the rear window. When the window could not be opened, Barney
demanded that Bello produce a key (Mtr.l6).

Bello produced the key and Barney

6

Although Barney said he stopped the vehicle to investigate whether the driver
was drunk, he did not ask any questions concerning alcohol after he pulled Bello over
(Mtr.32).
7

At this point, Barney commenced to write a warning citation for cracked
windshield and swerving (Mtr.22). However, he did not finish writing the citation, believing
that Bello was trafficking narcotics (Mtr.22-23).
8

Barney indicated that Bello was not free to leave at this point (Mtr.46).
-6-

immediately began searching the truck, relating to Bello that he had smelled marijuana
(Mtr.16-17).
At no point during the stop and detention did Barney attempt to obtain a
telephonic warrant, even though one could have easily been obtained (Mtr.42).
Subsequently, without having discovered any marijuana in the truck, Barney placed Bello
under arrest for possession of marijuana (Mtr.20, 48). Other officers arrived on the scene
and a detail search was then conducted. Ultimately, the officers discovered 120 pounds of
marijuana in the underside of the pickup bed (Mtr.21).
Thereafter, Bello was charged with a second degree felony of possession of
marijuana, a violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(i) (Supp. 1991) (R.l). He filed
a motion to suppress evidence seized from him as a result of the warrantless search of his
vehicle (R.25). A hearing was held June 24, 1991, and the motion was eventually denied
March 14, 1992. R.71.
On April 29, 1992, pursuant to stipulated facts, the matter was then tried
before the district court.

The court found Bello guilty as charged (Tr. 12-13).

On

November 24, 1992, upon a finding of good cause under UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-402
(Supp. 1992), the court granted a one-degree reduction of the charge and sentenced Bello
to a prison term of zero to five years. The sentence, however, was stayed pending appeal
(R.216-218).
Subsequently, on November 25, 1992, Bello filed a notice of appeal with the
court below (R.206). There are no prior or related appeals in this matter.
-7-

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Because the district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are
inadequate to allow meaningful appellate review, this Court should remand the case for
further findings and conclusions. In the event this Court finds the record sufficient enough
for review, Bello urges this Court to find the stop of his truck for weaving a pretext to
conduct an investigation unrelated to the traffic stop.
Bello was unreasonably detained by Barney at the point Barney followed him
for approximately two miles and then allayed his fear that Bellow might be impaired or
intoxicated.
The warrantless search of Bello's truck violated article 1, section 14 of the
Utah Constitution because the search lacked reasonable suspicion and exigent
circumstances. In addition, Bello's consent was involuntary and insufficiently attenuated
from the illegal stop. Moreover, Barney's search of Bello's truck exceeded the scope of
consent.
ARGUMENT
Standard of Review
This Court reviews a district court's factual findings on a motion to suppress
for clear error. However, the ultimate legal conclusions based on the underlying facts, such
as whether a stop was pretextual or whether consent was properly obtained, or the

-8-

magnitude of protection afforded by the state constitution, are reviewed de novo, for
correction of error. See State v. Strickling, 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 69, 69 (Ct. App. 1992);
State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); State v. Vigil 815 P.2d 1296,
1301 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). See generally State v. Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 26
(S. Ct. 1993) (resolving the conflict in this Court on standard of review).
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT'S FACTUAL FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW ARE INADEQUATE AND CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
Bello is aware that "[a]n appellant raising issues of fact on appeal must . . .
marshall all the evidence supporting the trial court's findings, and then show that evidence
to be insufficient." State v. Drobel 815 P.2d 724, 734-735 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied,
836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1991). Accord, State v. Gallegos, 210 Utah Adv. Rep. 49, 51 (Ct.
App. 1993). The district court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error and its legal
coijclusions are reviewed for correction of error. See State v. Thurman, 203 Utah Adv.
Rep. 18, 26 (S. Ct. 1993).
The district court found that Bello responded "Yes Sir," to Barney's demand
to search.

Order, Findings If 10. The court then went on to conclude that Bello

"voluntarily consented to the search and there is no evidence of coercion." Id., Conclusions
f 3. Marshalling the evidence, if Bello had in fact responded "yes sir" to Barney's demand,
the court's findings will be credible. As the videotape demonstrates, however, at no point
-9-

did Bello voluntarily consented to the search. Barney, rather than make a request, ordered
Bello out of the vehicle upon his noticing faint whiffs of marijuana. See Mtr.ll, 14, 45.
Thus, Bello's response was not spontaneous but a mere acquiescence to the demands of a
police officer. See Sims, 808 P.2d at 151. See generally State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 468469 n.8 (Utah Ct. App.); cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (1992) (ultimate conclusion of this
nature defeats purpose of appellate review). Consequently, the district court's factual
findings are "against the clear weight of the evidence," State v. Rochell, 210 Utah Adv. Rep.
40, 43 (Ct. App. 1993) (Bench, J., concurring), because erroneous and not supported by the
evidence. See State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987).
More important, the district court's conclusion of law on the consent issue
clearly is incorrect. See Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. at 27 (trial court's determination
of exploitation [or lack thereof] is reviewed for correctness). Accord, Rochell, 210 Utah
Adv. Rep. at 41; Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d at 654. In spite of Bello's persistent demand,9 the
district court made neither a finding nor conclusion regarding whether the consent, if any,
was obtained by exploitation of prior illegality. See State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah
1990) (whether consent following police misconduct is valid is determined by whether
consent was obtained by exploitation of prior illegality). Accord, Thurman, 203 Utah Adv.
Rep. at 22. Moreover, the district court's cursory conclusion on the voluntariness of Bello's

See Memorandum In Support of Motion to Reconsider, R.102.
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consent is erroneous. The court made no finding on whether the consent was a product
of free will or mere acquiescence to lawful authority. See State v. Marshall 791 P.2d 880,
888 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (conclusory finding that defendant "consented" to search and
there was no evidence of coercion "not particularly helpful in determining whether . . .
consent was 'unequivocal and specific'"). Cf. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991).
In addition, the court found "[t]here was no erratic behavior by [Belloj's
vehicle while being pursued" for approximately two miles prior to the stop. Order, Findings
H1I 2-3. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the "initial traffic stop was pursuant to a
legitimate law enforcement function." Order, Conclusions K 1; see also R.303, Transcript
of Motion to Reconsider, 3/10/92, at 10-11. This Court, however, has concluded that once
an officer allays his or her initial curiosity about whether a suspect has committed a traffic
violation, the suspect should be allowed to proceed on his or her journey without any delay.
See, e.g.. State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214, 1217 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (once officer notices
defendant's vehicle had valid license sticker, reasonable suspicion no longer exists to justify
stop); State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 492 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (no reasonable suspicion to
stop defendant's vehicle where officer testified he didn't observe any traffic violation while
pursuing vehicle). Accord, State v. Castner, 825 P.2d 699, 703 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); State
v. Hansen, 837 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Thus, the district court's own findings
of fact belies its conclusions of law.
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Further, Bello contended below that the search violated Article 1, Section 14,
of the Utah Constitution. See State v. Buford, 820 P.2d 1381, 1384 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)
(argument for independent state constitutional analysis should begin in trial court).
Accord, State v. White, 210 Utah Adv. Rep. 59, 60 (Ct. App. 1993). The State, who had
the burden of demonstrating that the warrantless search otherwise was lawful under the
state constitution, Zissi v. State Tax Comm. of Utah, 842 P.2d 848, 859 (Utah 1992);
Marshall 791 P.2d at 886-887, failed to respond to the argument. See Zissi, 842 P.2d at
859 (a party who fails to respond to opponent's argument is presumed to accept validity of
argument).

Neither does the district court.

See Order.10

Consequently, the district

court's findings and conclusions are "very sketchy and entirely failed to address critical
issues," Lovegren, 798 P.2d at 770, thus leaving this Court with no "determination to
review." Carter, 812 P.2d at 465. Accord, Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1050; Marshall, 791 P.2d at

10

Relying on State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 40 (Utah 1990), Bello urged the district
court in his motion to suppress to analyze whether the stop and search independently ran
afoul the Utah Constitution. See State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1265 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); State
v. Naisbitt, 827 P.2d 969, 972 n.7 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The court denied Bello's motion
to suppress without addressing the state constitutional issues. See Order, Addendum I.
In light of this Court's consistent holding that findings of fact and conclusions of law "must
be sufficiently detailed" and should cover all relevant issues including arguments for
independent state constitutional analysis, see Marshall, 791 P.2d at 882, and Buford, 820
P.2d at 1384, Bello filed a Motion to Reconsider, urging the district court to augment its
findings and conclusions to cover all relevant issues, including state constitutional analysis
and recent case law development. See R.102, 126. The court again denied this motion.
Bello then filed a petition for permission to file an interlocutory appeal with this Court,
which petition was denied. See Addendum III.
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882. As such, this case should be remanded for detailed findings of fact and conclusions
of law. Id.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the trial court's findings and
conclusions are insufficient, incorrect, and do not address all the relevant issues. See
Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1043-1044.

Thus, this Court lacks the necessary information to

undertake meaningful review of the issues raised by Bello. Lender these circumstances, this
case must be remanded to the district court for a detailed findings of fact and conclusions
of law. See generally State v. Strain, 779 P.2d 221, 227 (Utah 1989); Lovegren, 798 P.2d
at 771 n.ll; Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1050. In the event this Court were to review the district
court's findings and conclusions, Bello submits the following argument.
POINT II
THE INITIAL TRAFFIC STOP WAS UNREASONABLE AND A
PRETEXT FOR AN INVESTIGATION INTO MATTERS UNRELATED
TO THE STOP.
This Court, in State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), rev'd
on other grds.. State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), held that the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution prohibit the State from
employing an unreasonable or pretextual traffic stop as a means for investigating occupants
of an automobile. Accord, State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989); Marshall 791
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P.2d at 883. u Thus, Barney's stop of the truck can be constitutionally justified on one of
two alternative grounds: First, it could be based on specific, articulable facts, which together
with rational inferences drawn from those facts, would lead a reasonable person to
conclude defendant had committed or was about to commit a crime. Second, the stop
could be incident to a lawful citation for weaving.
Anything less would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed
rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result
the United States Supreme Court has consistently refused to sanction.
Sierra, 754 P.2d at 975. Accord, State v. Strickling, 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 69 (Ct. App.
1992).

A.

Reasonable Suspicion
For a motor vehicle stop to comply with constitutionally required reasonable

suspicion, this Court looks at the "totality of the circumstances confronting the officer at
the time of the seizure." Sierra, 754 P.2d at 975. Accord, Strickling. 201 Utah Adv. Rep.
at 70; State v. Munsen, 821 P.2d 13, 15 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). See generally Lopez, 831
P.2d at 1043 (chronicling circumstances justifying stopping a vehicle).

11

Although those cases were analyzed under the federal constitution, Bello
submits that the State Constitution similarly prohibits pretext stops. See POINT IV, infra.
See also State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah C t App. 1992), cert, granted, 843 P.2d
1042 (Utah 1992).
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In Sierra, this Court found that a traffic stop to cite the defendant for
following too close was unreasonable and a pretext for a further investigation.

That

decision was premised on two circumstances surrounding the stop of the defendant. See
id. at 975. The first involved the officer's misapplication of the statute prohibiting vehicles
from driving in the left lane on the freeway. The officer who made the stop told the driver
he was obligated to pull to the right immediately after passing another vehicle. The statute
relied upon by the officer in fact required that a driver move to the right land as soon as
practical. Based on the officer's misinterpretation of the statute and the lack of a complete
record on the driving pattern, this Court was unable to conclude that the defendant had
in fact violated the law. See id. at 979.
More important to this Court was the officer's actions preceding the stop.
This Court noted that the officer was suspicious of the defendant before he observed any
traffic violation. The officer, prior to making the stop, had called for a check on the
vehicle's license plate to determine if the vehicle was stolen. Backup assistance had been
called for before the stop, and the officer had to exceed the speed limit in order to catch
up with the defendant.
After reviewing the facts under the totality of the circumstances, this Court
concluded that defendant's nervousness was not inconsistent with innocent behavior and
the officer's decision to stop his car "was based on nothing more than an unconstitutional
hunch" that defendant was carrying narcotics. Sierra, 754 P.2d at 976. See also United
- 15-

States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1985) (Spanish appearance, oul of state license
plates and sole concern that defendant was transporting narcotics do not justify Terry stop);
State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987) (Mexican appearance, out of state license
plates and nervousness do not constitute reasonable suspicion); State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d
85, 89 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (nervousness is consistent with innocent as well as criminal
behavior); State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652, 655 (Utah C t App. 1992) (same).12
Here, Barney stopped the truck allegedly for temporarily straddling the lanes.
He, however, acknowledged that the extreme canyon winds could have been responsible for
the straddling. Bello submits that Barney had no reason whatsoever to stop him after
following the truck for approximately two miles without observing any straddling or unusual
driving pattern. In State v. Talbot 792 P.2d 489, 492 (Utah C t App. 1990), this Court held
the officer had no reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant's vehicle where officer
testified he didn't observe any traffic violation while pursuing vehicle.
The only reported explanation for detaining Bello from this point on was the
fact that the truck had California license plates and its occupant appeared nervous.13
Thus, without having a legitimate reason for being there at that point, Barney proceeded
to question and then search. His failure to allow Bello to proceed on his journey was

12

But see Marshall 791 P.2d at 880 (stop of defendant's vehicle
malfunctioning turn signal not pretext to search).
13

The video tape of the stop does not confirm Barney's observation.
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for

clearly to further investigate him for possible crimes unrelated to the initial stop.
Moreover, it is important to point out that Barney did not once question Bello regarding
alcohol, his purported concern for initially stopping the truck. Rather, like the officer in
Sierra, the trooper requested a backup and subsequently checked Bello's criminal records
and conducted a search of the truck. It is clear that the stop at this point had become a
pretext to search.
In State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), this Court was
confronted with facts quite similar to those in the instant case. In Baird, a highway patrol
officer was parked in a median on Interstate 15 near Moab, for the purpose of checking
the speed of passing cars with a radar unit. As he sat in his vehicle the officer observed
a late model cadillac approaching at 56 miles per hour. The car had Arizona license plates
that somehow did not appear to the officer to be valid. The officer was unaware of
Arizona's color scheme for determining sticker validity. Nevertheless, the officer followed
the car and then stopped it purportedly to check out the sticker's validity.

As he

approached the vehicle, the officer, among other things, detected the odor of marijuana.
After discovering through dispatch that the driver had a suspended driver's license, the
officer arrested him and had the car towed to Nephi and searched without the owner's
consent. The search resulted in the discovery of 165 pounds of marijuana in the truck. See
Baird, 763 P.2d at 1214.
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On appeal, this Court, after finding the initial stop pretextual, accorded no
weight to the officer's detection of odor of marijuana. This Court concluded:
[T]he officer articulated "something just struck me funny about it"
referring to the license plate sticker. Alone this does not approach
reasonable and articulable suspicion. The state attempted to justify the stop
by the after-discovered evidence . . . While this may have justified a further
inquiry of the driver after a valid stop, such articulable suspicion must be
present at the time of the stop.
Id. at 1216-1217 (emphasis added and footnote omitted). See also Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d
at 655 (final result of discovering evidence of criminal behavior does not validate prior
police illegality).
This case is Baird revisited.

Once Barney observed no unusual driving

pattern, he had no reasonable suspicion to believe that the driver of the truck was engaged
in or about to engage in criminal activity. See id.; Talbot 792 P.2d at 492. Therefore, his
approach to the driver's window and demand for identification was unlawful.

Further,

unlike the officer in Baird, the trooper did not discover any incriminating evidence pursuant
to the NCIC check. Bello's license was valid and the truck had not been reported stolen.
Moreover, Bello's alleged nervousness and the fact that the trooper detected the odor of
marijuana are not enough to justify further inquiry. See id.; see generally Schlosser, 774
P.2d at 1137 (nervousness not ground to support reasonable suspicion); Mendoza, 748 P.2d
at 184 (same); Sierra, 754 P.2d 976 (same).
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Based on the foregoing, Bello submits that all evidence seized from the
unlawful search and seizure should have been suppressed.
B.

Stop Incident to Traffic Violation
A police officer may constitutionally stop a vehicle for a traffic violation

committed in his or her presence. State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119 (Utah 1984); State v.
Figueroa-Solorio, 830 P.2d 276, 278 (Utah Ct. App. 1992): State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913,
917 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The officer may not, however, use a misdemeanor violation as
a springboard for launching a full scale search of such vehicle without probable cause. See
Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977; State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), aff d on
this grd.; rev'd on other grds.. 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990).
Bello already has assailed the district court's conclusion that the stop was
pursuant to a legitimate law enforcement function, because the court's findings of fact
contradicts its conclusion of law. See POINT I, supra.14 Neither the State nor the court
explained what the legitimate police function involved, particularly after the officer pursued
the truck for approximately two miles without observing any unusual driving pattern. See
Order, Findings fflf 2-3. This Court dealt with a similar issue in Arroyo. There, the
defendant was driving on Interstate 15 and was stopped by an off-duty highway patrol

14

The bifurcated standard of review enunciated by this Court in Vigil 815 P.2d
at 1298-1301, and adopted by the supreme court in Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. at 26,
applies to the district court's findings and conclusions. See generally Kishner and Davis,
Investigatory Stops Revisted, 6 Utah B.J. 10 (May, 1993).
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trooper. The trooper observed him traveling at approximately fifty miles per hour following
another vehicle at a distance of three to eight car lengths. The trooper, who was traveling
in the opposite direction of the defendant's vehicle, had to make a U-turn through the
freeway median. He did not immediately stop the defendant, but pulled alongside him and
noticed that the defendant was Hispanic and the vehicle had out of state license plates.
The trooper then pulled back and stopped the defendant. The purpose of the stop was to
cite the defendant for following too closely. This Court noted that very few citations are
issued for that offense, concluding:
We are persuaded that a reasonable officer would not have stopped
Arroyo and cited him for 'following too closely' except for some unarticulated
suspicion of more serious criminal activity.
Arroyo, 770 P.2d at 155. This Court's conclusion has subsequently been affirmed by the
Utah Supreme Court. Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688; see also Sierra, 754 P.2d at 979 ("We are
persuaded that a reasonable officer would not have stopped Sierra's car and issued a
warning citation for travelling in the left lane but for his desire to [conduct further criminal
investigation]").
The facts and circumstances in the instant case indicate that Trooper Barney's
motivation for stopping the truck was investigatory. Even if his initial reason for wanting
to stop the truck was legitimate, his intention to search for evidence of crimes became
obvious when he continued to follow the truck despite his observation, for two miles, of no
unusual driving pattern. See State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Although
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the trooper purportedly stopped the truck for straddling or weaving, he never checked to
find out the reason for the straddling, apparently because he knew the winds were primarily
responsible. Thus, his actions were more unreasonable than the officers' actions in Arroyo,
Sierra, and Mendoza, which the courts found impermissible under the Fourth Amendment.
While the officer therein could justify stopping the defendants initially for "following too
closely," or "for staying in the left-hand lanes," such justification was unavailable to Barney,
because most reasonable officers do not stop drivers for temporarily straddling lanes,
particularly under extreme canyon winds as in the instant case when there exists other
reasonable explanation for the driving pattern.15

C.

The Stop of Bello's Truck was Pretextual
In this Court's "watershed pretext case,"16 Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1040, this

Court noted that a pretext stop can occur in two distinct situations.
First, we have applied [the doctrine] where the facts demonstrated the driver
did not commit a traffic violation. . . . The second situation is where the
driver committed a minor traffic violation or the vehicle had a minor
equipment problem, but where the court concludes that a reasonable officer
would not have stopped the vehicle absent the unconstitutional motivation.

15

To date, counsel is unaware of any Utah law prohibiting weaving or straddling
the lanes. Cf. UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-53 et seq. (1953, as amended). In addition, as
this Court as recognized, straddling or weaving is a fertile ground upon which the police
normally plants the seed of pretextual stops. See Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1050 n.17 (naming
scenarios for pretext stops).
16

Strickling, 201 Utah Adv. Rep. at 72.
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Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1044 (footnote and citations omitted). The standard for determining
whether the traffic stop in this case is pretextual is whether a reasonable officer, under the
totality of the circumstances, would have stopped the truck for temporarily straddling the
lanes, even after the hypothetical officer had observed no straddling or any unusual driving
pattern for two miles and had acknowledged that the temporary straddling could have been
caused by powerful canyon winds. See United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1515-1517
(10th Cir. 1988); Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1046; Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977. This Court reviews the
district court's conclusion on a pretext issue for correctness. State v. Palmer, 803 P.2d
1249, 1252 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991); Lopez, 831 P.2d
at 1044.
1.

No Traffic Violation
As demonstrated above, neither the State nor the district court could

articulate the traffic violation committed by Bello. See Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1049 ("the State
must establish that a traffic violation occurred"). There simply was no reason for Barney
not to allow Bello to proceed at the point when he observed no citable traffic violation.
See Talbot, 792 P.2d at 492; Baird, 763 P.2d at 1216. Because there was no citable or
articulable traffic violation, a reasonable officer would not have stopped and questioned
Bello.

Id.

Thus, Barney's actions clearly demonstrate a pretextual traffic stop and

detention to conduct further investigation for evidence of possible crimes. See United
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States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 708 (11th Cir. 1986) (invalidating stop for weaving on pretext
ground); United States v. Lavmon, 730 F. Supp. 332 (D. Colo. 1990) (same); Baird, 763
P.2d at 1216 (invalidating stop where officer could not articulate citable traffic violation).
Moreover, even if Barney had reasonable grounds for initially stopping the
truck, the reasonableness of the stop would have ended when he discovered that Bello was
neither drowsy nor impaired. See Order, Findings H 5. See generally Godina-Luna, 826
P.2d at 654-655 (once officer verified defendants were sober, reasonable suspicion to detain
no longer exists). Although Bello was stopped for driving impaired, "[o]fficer [Barney] did
nothing to confirm or deny his suspicion that [Bello] was under the influence of drugs or
alcohol. He did not administer a sobriety test or take any other appropriate action to
determine whether [Bello was intoxicated]." State v. Lovegren, 829 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992).17 Thus, all of Barney's actions were consistent with an investigative motive.
That Barney subsequently detected the odor of marijuana does not validate the pretextual
stop. See Baird, 763 P.2d at 1214; Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688. Cf. Lovegren, 829 P.2d at 159
(that officer ultimately discovered drug trafficking evidence does not justify unlawful
detention of motorist); Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d at 655. Therefore, the district court erred
in refusing to suppress the evidence seized from Bello.

17

Circumstances surrounding a stop, including the officer's actions, are relevant
in analyzing pretext stops. See Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1048-1049.
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2.

Even If Traffic Violation, It Was A Minor One That Did Not
Warrant A Seizure
"When a defendant raises . . . a claim of pretextuality, 'the proper inquiry is

whether a reasonable officer would have made the seizure in the absence of illegitimate
motivation.'1' United States v. Valdez, 931 F.2d 1448, 1450 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting Smith,
799 F.2d at 708) (emphasis in Smith). Accord, State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988), affd, 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1990); State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040, 10481049 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The district court's conclusion did not address whether a
reasonable officer would have made the stop in question. See Order. Its conclusion that
the stop was pursuant to a legitimate law enforcement function, however, is clearly
incorrect in light of its findings that Bello did not drive erratically and was not impaired.
Even assuming that weaving between the lanes was a traffic violation, such
a violation is one routinely overlooked by the police.18 In Smith, Judge Kravitch, in her
now oft-quoted passage, wrote that a stop is "unreasonable not because the officer secretly
hoped to find evidence of a greater offense, but because it was clear that an officer would
have been uninterested in pursuing the lesser offense absent that hope." Smith, 799 F.2d
at 710. In this case, absent his hope of discovering contraband, Barney would have been
uninterested in pursuing Bello for weaving. Further, Barney's illegitimate motivation is
glaringly exposed by the circumstances surrounding the stop. See supra note 17. Although
18

See supra note 15.
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Barney's concern was that Bello weaved out of the lanes because he was impaired, he
observed nothing indicative of driving under the influence while pursuing Bello for two
miles. In addition, Barney acknowledged that Bello's truck must have straddled because
of the high canyon winds. It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that Barney's intent was
not to pursue the weaving "violation" or the possible drunk driving, but to conduct an
investigation unrelated to the purported reason for the initial stop. "[OJnce the officerf]
determined that [Bello] was not driving under the influence, the purpose of the stop was
satisfied, and any subsequent action by the officer[] cannot be said to be reasonably related
to the original purpose of the stop." State v. Hansen, 837 P.2d 987, 989 (Utah Ct App.
1992) (emphasis added). "To permit police officers to use any minor traffic violation as a
pretext to stop a vehicle encourages the selective enforcement of traffic regulations against
minorities or 'suspicious' classes, such as those with an unorthodox appearance or out-ofstate license plates." Lopez, 831 P.2d at 1046. Consequently, the district court's decision
refusing to find the stop pretextual under state and federal constitutions should be reversed.
POINT III
THE OFFICER UNREASONABLY DETAINED BELLO FOLLOWING
THE STOP.
Bello filed a motion to reconsider, urging the district court to determine
whether he was unreasonably detained following the stop. Without any findings of fact or
conclusions of law, the motion was denied on March 10, 1992. See R.303-314, Transcript
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of Motion to Reconsider, 3/10/92, at 10-11. Consequently, there is no determination for
this Court to review. State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 465 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Were the
Court to find the record sufficient for review, State v. Castner, 825 P.2d 699, 704 (Utah Ct
App. 1992), Bello submits the following argument.
Even if the initial stop was valid, this Court must next consider the detention
and search that followed and determine "whether it was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 19-20 (1968). Accord, United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1518 (10th Cir. 1988);
State v. Lovegren, 829 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d
652, 654 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 917 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
In determining whether the detention is appropriate as an investigatory stop, the inquiry
is "'whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm
or dispel their suspicions quickly. . . .'" United States v. Harris, 928 F.2d 1113, 1117 (11th
Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1575
(1985)); State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 884 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In other words, "'[t]he
length and scope of detention must be "strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances
which rendered its initiation permissible.'" State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991)
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20). The basis and circumstances surrounding the stop,
rather than arbitrary time limit, are determinative when considering permissible length of
a stop. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685-687, 105 S. Ct. at 1574-1575.
-26-

In Godina-Luna, the officer observed defendants' car weave in and out of
traffic lanes. Suspecting the driver might be intoxicated, the officer pulled the vehicle over.
After stooping the vehicle, the officer concluded that defendants were not intoxicated.
However, because they were nervous, the officer demanded their identification, which they
promptly produced. He conducted an NCIC check, which turned out negative. Thereafter,
he asked the defendants if they had firearms or narcotics in the vehicle. One defendant
answered "No, but if you'd like to check, go ahead." The ensuing search revealed four
kilograms of cocaine. See id., 826 P.2d at 654.
The defendants then moved to suppress the evidence, alleging the stop was
pretextual and the consent invalid because obtained by exploitation of the illegal stop. The
district court found the stop legitimate, but concluded the officer exceeded the scope of his
authority after discovering that the defendants were not intoxicated.

On appeal, the

question was whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to further detain and question
the defendants after discovering they were sober. This Court answered in the negative,
holding that "[o]nce the reasons for the initial stop have been satisfied, the individual must
be allowed to proceed on his or her way." Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d at 654-655. "Although
the deputy's hunch ultimately proved to be correct, a hunch, without more, does not raise
a reasonable articulable suspicion regardless of the final result. Id. at 655.
This case is akin to Godina-Luna. If the purpose of the stop truly was to
check if Bello was intoxicated, then that purpose ended when Barney confirmed that Bello
-27-

was not impaired. Once Barney "determined that [Belloj's abilities were not impaired due
to intoxication or drowsiness," Order, Findings H 5, he had no reason to further detain and
question Bello. See Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d at 655;19 see also Hansen, 837 P.2d at 989 (no
reasonable suspicion to detain after officer confirmed suspect was not intoxicated); accord,
Johnson, 805 P.2d at 763 (no reasonable suspicion to detain defendant passenger after
traffic stop); State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 436 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (no reasonable
suspicion to detain defendants following traffic stop); cf. also Lovegren, 829 P.2d at 158
(officer had no reasonable suspicion to further detain defendants after traffic stop, where
officer had no basis for concluding that defendants were intoxicated); see generally State
v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (no reasonable suspicion to stop and question
defendant after officer had discovered that defendant's vehicle had valid license sticker, the
purported reason for the initial stop).
Moreover, that Bello appeared nervous was not indicative of criminal
behavior and did not give rise to reasonable suspicion to detain. See, e.g., United States
v. Walker, 933 F.2d 812, 817 (10th Cir. 1991) ("defendant's nervousness did not give rise

19

Subsequent to denial of his motion to suppress, Bello urged the district court
to reconsider its decision, based on Godina-Luna, then recently decided by this Court, that
Barney lacked reasonable suspicion to stop and detain him. See R.102. The district court
again denied the motion. His petition for an interlocutory appeal was also denied by this
Court. Thus, Bello submits that the detention issue was properly preserved for this Court's
consideration. Cf. State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 917 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
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to an objective reasonable suspicion"). Accord, Lovegren, 829 P.2d at 158; Godina-Luna,
826 P.2d at 654; Robinson. 797 P.2d at 436; Sierra, 754 P.2d at 976.
Based on the foregoing, Bello urges this Court to reverse the decision of the
district court and conclude that he was unreasonably detained following the traffic stop, in
violation of his right under state and federal constitutions.
POINT IV
THIS COURT SHOULD INDEPENDENTLY INTERPRET ARTICLE I,
SECTION 14, OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION FROM THE
INTERPRETATION GIVEN THE FOURTH AMENDMENT BY THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND CONCLUDE THAT THE
WARRANTLESS AUTOMOBILE SEARCH CONDUCTED BY OFFICER
BARNEY IS PER SE UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION BECAUSE IT LACKED REASONABLE SUSPICION
AND THERE WAS NO EMERGENCY PREVENTING THE TROOPER
FROM OBTAINING A WARRANT.
Although Article I, Section 14, of the Utah Constitution is Fourth
Amendment verbatim, this court should independently interpret that provision from the
interpretation given the amendment by the United States Supreme Court.20 Pursuant to
the primacy model of constitutional interpretation,21 the Utah constitution should be the

20

See State v. Earl. 716 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1986) (imploring Utah lawyers to
brief Utah courts on state constitutional issues); State v. White, 210 Utah Adv. Rep. 59, 60
(Ct. App. 1993); State v. Bradford. 839 P.2d 866, 868 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (same).
21

The primacy model posits that, because several state constitutions predate the
federal constitution, "state constitutions should be looked to first in developing protections
for individual rights." Comment, The Utah Supreme Court and the Utah State
Constitution. 1986 Utah L. Rev. 319, 326 n.34. See also Linde, First Things First:
Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. Bait. L. Rev. 379, 380 (1980).
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primary source for protecting citizens' rights. Secondly, independent interpretation by this
court will foster predictability and "insulate[s] the states' citizens from the vagaries of
inconsistent interpretations given to the fourth amendment by the federal courts."22
Thirdly, such independent interpretation will positively reinvigorate the state's sovereignty
under our federal system of government.23 More importantly, Article I, Section 14 of the
Utah Constitution should be interpreted differently from the fourth amendment because
of the following reasons:
A.

Utah ys Unique History
No other territory experienced the difficulties encountered by Utah before

obtaining statehood. The difficulties stemmed mainly from the settlers' practice of slavery
and polygamy, the twin "sins" that made Congress look unfavorably towards granting
statehood to the territory.24
Utahns drafted seven constitutions before the state was admitted into the
Union. The first, the Constitution of Deseret of 1849, served as the model for other Utah

22

State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 n.8 (Utah 1988).

23

See Linde, supra note 21, at 383.

24

See E. Firmage and R. Mangrum, Zion in the Courts 127 (Univ. Illinois Press
1988); Flynn, Federalism and Viable State Government-The History of Utah's
Constitution, 1966 Utah L. Rev. 311, 316; Hickman, Utah Constitutional Law 45 (1954)
(unpublished thesis in University of Utah Library).
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constitutions.25 There is disagreement, however, on whether the 1849 Constitution was
patterned after the Illinois Constitution of 181826 or the Iowa Constitution of 1846.27
Nevertheless, it is undisputed that the last Utah constitution, adopted in 1896, borrowed
heavily from the constitutions of Nevada, Washington, Illinois and New York.28
Utah's constitutions, like many other state constitutions drafted in the
nineteenth century, reflect the prevailing sentiment of deep mistrust of the government.29
Article 8 of the 1849 Constitution, for example, prohibited unreasonable searches and
seizures,30 and subsequent

Utah constitutions similarly prohibited

such searches.

Historically, Utah judges have never hesitated in finding unconstitutional searches
conducted on less than probable cause or statutes authorizing them.31

25

See Flynn, supra note 24, at 315; Hickman, supra note 35, at 42.

26

See id. (arguing Illinois).

27

See Crawley, The Constitution of the State of Deseret 29 B.Y.U. Studies 7, 15
(1989), stating that several articles in the 1849 Constitution were copied "word for word"
from the Iowa Constitution, which today is federal and Utah constitutions verbatim.
28

See generally Flynn, supra note 24, at 323.

29

See id. at 314.

30

See Crawley, supra note 27, at 16. Unfortunately, as of today, research has not
discovered a contemporaneous legislative debate on the adoption of this provision.
Nonetheless, it is well documented that residents of the Utah territory were generally
familiar with unconstitutional searches and the constitutions of other states prohibiting
unreasonable searches and seizures. See Ivins, A Constitution for Utah, 25 Hist. Q. 95, 100
(1957); Flynn, supra note 24.
31

See generally Hickman, supra note 24, at 386-390.
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The utmost devotion by these judges to constitutionally sound searches
stemmed apparently from their unique experience as citizens of the Utah territory.32 As
mentioned earlier, the settlers widely practiced polygamy, a "relief] of barbarism" that
Congress was determined to stamp out/ 3

Therefore, it is not uncommon for federal

marshals, in blatant violation of the fourth amendment, to break into churches and homes
during the day or at night in search of polygamists.34 To the dismay of early Utahns, night
time search, "the evil in its most obnoxious form,"35 was conducted with great frequency
and without probable cause.36 A frustrated and weary Mormon leader once decried these

32

It is no longer folklore that early Mormon settlers were intolerantly driven to
the territory from New York, Illinois, Missouri and Pennsylvania. See Firmage and
Mangrum, supra note 24, at 125-27.
33

Hickman, supra note 24, at 45; Firmage and Mangrum, supra note 24, at 127,

160.
34

See Bradley, Hide and Seek: Children on the Underground, 51 Utah Hist. Q.
133, 142 (1983) (recounting how the home of a polygamist was searched 100 times in four
years). See also "How They Do It," Deseret News Weekly, Jan. 20, 1886, at 1 (recounting
how federal marshals clearly engaged in unconstitutional search of a polygamist's home by
breaking the door with an axe without the authority of a warrant).
Professor Firmage similarly observes that during the nineteenth century "federal
attempts to simplify and expedite the conviction of polygamists routinely denied Mormons
of many of their fundamental rights." Firmage, Religion and the Law: The Mormon
Experience in the Nineteenth Century, 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 765, 781 (1991).
35

Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 210 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See also
State v. Lindner, 592 P.2d 852, 857 (Idaho 1979) ("entry into an occupied dwelling in the
middle of the night is clearly a greater invasion of privacy than entry executed during the
daytime").
36

See Deseret News Weekly, Jan 20, 1886, at 1; Jan. 27, 1886, at 26; June 10,

1885, at 1.
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searches as a "perversion of the Constitution."37

Article I Section 14, thus, is not a

wholesale adoption of the search and seizure provisions of other state constitutions, but a
reflection of the deep distrust of Utahns for government and for unreasonable searches or
those conducted without probable cause.38
B.

Propriety of Independent Review under the Federal System
In our federal system, it is entirely proper for a state court to interpret its

constitution in a manner different from the United States Supreme Court's interpretation
of a similar federal provision.39 In the recent past, state courts have been interpreting
their own constitutions differently from federal interpretation to provide broader
protections to their citizens.40

37

First Presidency Message to General Conference of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints, Deseret News Weekly, April 13 & 14, 1886, at 196 (quoted in
Wallentine, Heeding the Call: Search and Seizure Jurisprudence Under the Utah
Constitution, Article 1, Section 14, 17 J. Contemp. Law 267, 279 n.80 (1991).
38

See Hickman, supra note 24, at 386-90.

39

See Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207 (1935); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S.
117, 125 (1945); Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Rd. Comm., 379 U.S. 487, 489 (1965); see also
State v. Marsalla, 579 A.2d 58, 63 (Conn. 1990) (in interpreting its own constitution, a state
court sits as "a court of last resort, subject only to the qualification that [its] interpretations
may not restrict the guarantees accorded the national citizenry under the federal charter").
See generally Durham, Employing the Utah Constitution, 2 Utah B.J. 25 (Nov. 1989). But
cf. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983) (admonishing state courts to make a clear
and concise statement of the independent state ground of their decision).
40

See Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions-Away From A Reactionary
Approach, 9 Hastings Const. L. Q. 1, 2-3 (1981); Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal
Procedure: State Courts Erosion of the Burger Court 62 Ky. L. J. 421, 425 (1974).
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The Utah Supreme Court has not been hesitant in independently interpreting
the Utah Constitution in a broad range of issues.41 In State v. Larroco, 794 P.2d 460
(Utah 1990), the court departed from confusing and irreconcilable federal automobile
search and seizure jurisprudence. 42 It held that under Article I, Section 14, a warrantless
automobile search is per se unconstitutional except when effectuated with probable cause
and to "protect safety of police or the public or to prevent the destruction of evidence."
Id. at 470. More recently, the Court similarly held that the exclusionary rule applies under
the Utah Constitution in quasi-criminal tax stamp cases. See Zissi v. State Tax Comm. of
Utah, 842 P.2d 848, 859 (Utah 1992) ("Utah Constitution's exclusionary rule prevents] the
Commission from admitting in evidence drugs [illegally] taken from [the suspect's] car").

C.

The Search in This Case Lacked Reasonable Suspicion and Exigent Circumstances
In Larocco, 794 P.2d at 460, the Utah supreme court departed from confusing

Federal automobile search and seizure case law. The Court concluded that warrantless
automobile searches are per se unconstitutional unless the police have probable cause to
believe that the automobile contained contraband and exigent circumstances require that
the automobile be searched before a warrant can be obtained. See id. at 470. Accord,

41

See Comment, supra note 21, at 320 (chronicling independent interpretation by
the Utah Supreme Court on right of access to preliminary hearings, parental rights,
separation of power, self-incrimination and standing).
42

See also People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 508 N.Y.S.2d 907 (New York 1986) ("fourth
amendment rules governing police conduct have been muddied and, and judicial
supervision of the warrant process diluted").
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Sims v. Utah State Tax Comm, 841 P.2d 6, 8 (Utah 1992); State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141, 148
n.13 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (Larocco's lead opinion requires probable cause and exigent
circumstances for warrantless vehicle search); State v. Naisbitt 827 P.2d 969, 973 n.7 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992).
In the instant case, as demonstrated above, Barney lacked probable cause or
reasonable suspicion to stop Bello. In addition, the Utah legislature does not authorize
indiscriminate stop of individuals and motor vehicles within the State. A citizen or vehicle
can be briefly stopped only if the officer has reasonable suspicion. See Sims, 808 P.2d at
141. Under the facts here, mere hunch that Bello possessed marijuana in the truck is
insufficient to satisfy the required probable cause or reasonable suspicion. See State v.
Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 976 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Barney did not observe any unusual
driving pattern as to have the requisite suspicion. The odor of marijuana detected from
the vehicle became apparent only subsequent to the illegal stop and detention. As such,
the general rule that detection of odor of marijuana gives an officer justification to search
a vehicle, United States v. Loucks, 806 F.2d 208, 209-210 (10th Cir. 1986), does not render
valid the search conducted in this case. See State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214, 1216-1217 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988) (after discovered evidence of crime does not justification to search).
Furthermore, there was no exigent circumstance under the facts of the instant
case. Bello was standing outside of the vehicle. There was no indication that evidence
could be lost or destroyed, and there was no attending danger to the officer. See State v.
Bovce, 758 P.2d 1017 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988). Cf. State v. Bradford, 839 P.2d 866, 870
-35-

(Utah C t App. 1992). Barney could have obtained a warrant to search the truck after he
detected the odor of marijuana.

See Larocco, 794 P.2d at 470. Indeed, he could have

obtained a telephonic warrant pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-4(2) (1953, as
amended). Id. Rather than obtaining a warrant, however, Barney conducted a full scale
search of the truck, thereby usurping the magistrate's traditional function of determining
whether probable cause to search exists. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
Consequently, even if Barney had probable cause to search based on the odor marijuana,
f,

[t]he considerations [under article 1, section 14] requiring a showing of exigent

circumstances under the automobile exception seem to apply with equal force to the search
of a vehicle based on an officer detecting the odor of marijuana." Naisbitt 827 P.2d at 973
n.7.
Because Bello's truck was searched without reasonable suspicion and Barney
was confronted with no exigencies, the evidence seized pursuant to the search should have
been suppressed by the district court as independently violative of article 1, section 14 of
the Utah Constitution.

POINT V
DEFENDANT'S CONSENT WAS INVALID BECAUSE IT WAS
INVOLUNTARY AND INSUFFICIENTLY ATTENUATED FROM THE
ILLEGAL STOP.
The district court concluded that Bello "voluntarily consented to the search
and there is no evidence of coercion." Order, Conclusions U 3. This conclusion, as assailed
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in POINT I, supra, is insufficient and not particularly helpful in examining voluntariness
of Bello's consent. There is no finding on whether the consent was free, equivocal and
specific, and therefore voluntary. See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 876; Marshall 791 P.2d at 888
(conclusory finding on consent insufficient in determining whether consent was unequivocal
or specific). Assuming arguendo that Bello's consent was non-coerced, evidence seized
from him must nonetheless be suppressed because the consent was the fruit of an illegal
stop. State v. Hargraves, 806 P.2d 228, 231 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).43
The Utah Supreme Court has made it clear that a consent search made
following illegal police conduct can be constitutionally valid only if it is voluntary, i.e., noncoerced and not arrived at by exploitation of the primary police illegality.

State v.

Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 20-21 (S. Ct. 1993); State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 688
(Utah 1990). Accord, State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 918 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); State
v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652, 655 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141, 151
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). This second prong requires the State to "establish the existence of
intervening factors which prove that the consent was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal
stop." Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 691.
43

As demonstrated above at POINT I, the district court did not address whether
Bello's consent was attenuated from the illegal stop. However, if this Court finds, as Bello
contends it is, that the record is sufficiently clear on the taintedness issue, this Court ought
not remand for further findings. See State v. Castner, 825 P.2d 699, 704 & n.3 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992). See generally Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604 (1975); Thurman, 203 Utah
Adv. Rep. at 27.
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In determining whether consent was obtained as a result of an exploitation
of prior police illegality, the Supreme Court has counselled examining several factors, such
as the temporal proximity of the illegality and the consent, the presence of intervening
circumstances, the flagrancy of the illegality, and whether defendant was Mirandized, see
Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 690-691 & n.4; accord Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. at 27; Sims, 808
P.2d at 150, including "whether the consent was volunteered rather than requested by
detaining officers, whether the detainee was made aware of the fact that he could decline
consent and thus prevent an immediate search, and whether the police purpose underlying
the illegality was to obtain the consent." Sims v. State Tax Comm., 841 P.2d 6, 10 (Utah
1992).

A.

Temporal Proximity of Stop and Consent
Bello's consent occurred immediately after Barney pretextually stopped him

for weaving. In Sims, where, as here, the trooper obtained a consent "in a very short time
span" or "within minutes" after an illegal roadblock, this Court concluded that there was not
"enough time to attenuate the relationship between the two." Sims, 808 P.2d at 151.
Accord, Sims, 841 P.2d at 10; State v. Park, 810 P.2d 456, 459 (Utah Ct. App.), cert,
denied, 817 P.2d 327 and 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). Similarly, in Godina-Luna, this Court
held the officer exploited his prior misconduct where "[t]he consent occurred during an
ongoing illegal seizure, thus no time factor separated the illegality from the consent." Id.,
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826 P.2d at 656. See also Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604 (1975) (two hour interval
insufficient to attenuate prior police misconduct).
B.

Intervening Circumstances
As in Sims, Barney stopped Bello, asked him for his license and registration,

detected the odor of marijuana, and demanded consent to search.
Nothing occurred which could have reasonably made [Bello] feel free to
proceed on his journey at any time between the moment of the stop and the
discoveries that prompted the trooper's request for consent to search [the
truckj. [Bello] did not spontaneously volunteer his consent, but gave it only
when asked. [Bellows consent, then arose from an unbroken chain of events
that began with the illegal [stop].
Sims, 808 P.2d at 151. See also Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d at 656; Park, 810 P.2d at 459.
C.

Flagrancy of the Illegality
The stop here was an unconstitutional stop and not one conducted for the

public good. As earlier argued, Barney stopped Bello solely to conduct investigations
unrelated to traffic violation. He had no articulable reason for not allowing Bello to
proceed on his journey after observing no unusual driving pattern and after Bello had
produced a valid license. Thus, the trooper's conduct was a calculated move to conduct a
warrantless search under the guise of a traffic stop. Cf. Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. at
27.
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D.

Miranda Warning
It is undisputed that Barney Mirandized Bello ex post facto. Barney had

already obtained Bello's consent and conducted a thorough search of the truck before
giving him Miranda warnings. In Carter, this Court concluded, inter alia, that failure to
give Miranda warnings taints the defendant's voluntary consent. See id., 812 P.2d at 470.

E.

Other Factors
Bello was never informed of his right to refuse consent. He did not volunteer

to have his truck searched. Rather, he merely acquiesced to Barney's demand. In addition,
Barney was aware of Utah telephonic warrant procedure, but chose to not request one.
Under the totality of the circumstances, Bello's consent, if any, was not sufficiently
attenuated from the illegal stop. See Sims, 841 P.2d at 10.
Based on the foregoing, this Court should order suppressed the evidence
seized from Bello because the searches which exposed the marijuana, even if consensual,
were not sufficiently attenuated to be purged of the prior illegal stop made by Barney.

POINT VI
THE SEARCH CONDUCTED BY THE TROOPER EXCEEDED THE
SCOPE OF DEFENDANT'S CONSENT.
Bello contended below that the search exceeded the scope of his alleged
consent. The district court, again, made neither a finding nor conclusion on this issue. See
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Order. Thus, this Court lacks the necessary tool to conduct meaningful appellate review.
Carter, 812 P.2d at 465. If this Court were to find the record sufficient enough to
determine the issue, see Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. at 27, Bello submits that the search
exceeded the scope of his consent.
"Even when a defendant voluntarily consents to a search, the ensuing search
must be limited in scope to only the specific area agreed to by defendant."

State v.

Marshall 791 P.2d 880, 888 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Accord, State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133,
137 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Assuming Bello consented to the search of the cabin portion
of the truck. Having found nothing therein, Barney ordered Bello to open up the truck bed
and proceeded to conduct a full scale search. A reasonable person in a similar position
would have acquiesced in the officer's demand that the bed be opened. See Florida v.
Jimeno,

U.S.

, 111 S. Ct. 1801, 1803-1804, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991). Bello submits

that the search "transcend[ed] the actual scope of the consent given [and] encroaches on
[his constitutional] rights." United States v. Gay, 774 F.2d 368, 377 (10th Cir. 1985).
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF REQUESTED
Because the district court's findings and conclusions are inadequate, this
Court should remand the case for further findings and conclusions. In the alternative, this
Court should reverse the district court's decision refusing to suppress the evidence seized
from Bello.
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REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
This case is fact-sensitive and counsel believes oral argument will aid the
Court in disposing the issues.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of May, 1993.

RONALD J. YENGICH
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

HAKEEM ISHOLA
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed/delivered a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Brief of Appellant, this

day of May, 1993, to Janet C. Graham, Utah

Attorney General, 235 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114.
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ADDENDUM I
ORDER

Vi\0\[

IN Till: SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR T
2

COUNTY OF S E V I F R ,

STATE OF UTAH

3
A

STATU OF UTAH,

5

CASE NO. 1281
Plaintiff,

6

JAMES RONALD BELLO,

7

ORDER

Defendant.

0
9

10

The Defendant's motion to suppress came, before the

11

Court on the 24th day of June 1991, Don Brown representing

12

the State of Utah, Ron Yengich representing the Defendant.

13

The Court heard the testimony, viewed the video, and

14

examined the truck and camper.

15

advisement the motion to suppress, pending receipt of

16

briefs .

17
18

The Court took under

NOW THEREFORE THE COURT makes the following
findings:
1.

19

On March 5, 1991, at-approximately 11:15 a.m.,

20

Deputy Sheriff Barney, while traveling west on 1-70,

21

observed an eastbouncl pickup truck driving with part of the

22

vehicle in each of the two travel lanes.
2.

23

Deputy Barney turned around, activated his

24

video recox^C(?v and pursued the vehicle to stop the vehicle

25

and determine if the driver was under the influence of

,1

1'AolI 2
1

alcohol, drowsy or olherwjsp impound.

2

behavior bv the Defendant's vehicle while being pursii^d.

3

3.

'ih<Me was no eijalj(

Deputy Barney slopped I he vehicle after

catching up with the vehicle approximately two miles Crorn
5

the location of the first observation.

6

4.

Deputy Barney advised the Defendant thai he

7

had been driving outside the regular lane of travel.

8

Defendant acknowledged he had been having trouble

9

controlling the vehicle due to the wind.

10

5.

Deputy Barney observed that the vehicle

11

windshield was cracked and also determined that the

12

Defendant's abilities were not impaired due to intoxication

13

or drowsiness.

14

6.

The Defendant, upon request, provided a copy

15

of the vehicle registration showing the cuner to be Pobby

16

Randall, dba AC Feed/Grain, 31 Fano A, Arcadia, California

17

91006.

18

7.

Deputy Barney smelled marijuana when he

19

approached the vehicle and again as he passed the camper

20

portion of the pickup as he returned to his vehicle to issue

21

a warning citation for a cracked windshield and weaving.

22

8.

The officer requested that the dispatcher

23

attempt to contact the owner of the vehicle; however, he was

24

advised that there was no telephone listed for the owner.

25

9.

Deputy Barney then returned to the subject

pA(ii:. :)

i

vehicle

aiivl a s k e d

7

vehic1c?"

t h e iJefendunl :

"May J look i n

t ho

3

10.

The. Defendant responded, "Yes, sir."

4

11.

Deputy Barney then inspected the cab area of

5

the vehicle and rhen went to the rear ot the vehicle and

6

pointed to the locking mechanism of the camper shell.
12.

7

The Defendant stated, "Do you u/ant the key?"

8

and, when Deputy Barney indicated that H? did, Bel Jo

9

retrieved the keV from the ignition.
13.

10
11

An inspection of the camper mec-i of the

behicle revealed more than 100 pounds of marijuana.

12

NOW THEREFORE, it is ordered that the Defendant's

13

Motion To Suppress is denied.

14

CONCLUSIONS OF LA\l!

15
16
17

1.

The initial traffic stop of the vehicle vias

pursuant to a legitimate 3 au; enforcement function.
2.

The officer, upon smelling the odor of rau/

13

marijuana, had probable cause to believe the Defendant was

19

engaged in possession of controlled substances,

20
21
22

3.

The Defendant voluntarily consented to the

search and there is no evidence of coercion.
4.

See Florida vs. Bostick, U.S. Supreme
20

23

Court, No. 89-1Z1I- June

24

authorized Laa' Enforcement Officers to ask questions and

25

obtain consent to search.

- 1991: the Court clearly

Wll- '
1

•o
P.i led t h i s
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Q.
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DONS/^TIBF^.
DislrictxCourl Judge

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct
opy of the above and foregoing COURT ORDER was mailed with
irst-class postage, prepaid, to the follou/ing:
R. DON BROWN
SEVIER COUNTY ATTORNEY
Sevier County Courthouse
250 North Main Street
Richfield, UT 84701

RONALD .J. YENGICH
ATTORNEY AT LAW
175 East 400 South, #400
Salt Lake Citv, UT 84111

\_^^^^^2^^^r
CAROLE ME£LOR,
Court &^=*y%#ve

ADDENDUM II

JUDGMENT

€
R. Don Brown #0464
Sevier County Attorney
Sevier County Courthouse
250 North Main Street
Richfield, Utah 84701
Telephone: (801) 896-6812
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

i
Plaintiff,

vs.

i
:

JAMES RONALD BELLO,

JUDGMENT

:
Defendant.

:

Case No. 911601281FS

The above-captioned matter having come on for Sentencing on the 24th
day of November, 1992, pursuant to the court's determination of guilty of the
offense of Possession of More Than One Hundred Pounds of Marijuana, a Second
Degree Felony, and the Court having entertained the arguments of R. Don Brown
for the State of Utah, and Ronald Yengich, Attorney for the Defendant, and
being apprised of no further impediment to entry of Judgment;
NOW THEREFORE, Regarding Possession of a Controlled Substance, the
court finds that this is an appropriate case to reduce the sentence one
degree, pursuant to Section 76-3-402, Utah Code Annotated, and, therefore, the
Defendant is sentenced to serve a terra of not to exceed five years in the Utah
State Prison, fined in the amount of $5,000.00, and ordered to pay a surcharge
of $1,250.00; provided that execution of the sentence shall be stayed during

Page 2—Judgment
State of Utah vs. James Ronald Bello
the period necessary for the Defendant to perfect an appeal and until the
appellate court rules on such appeal, if filed.
The Court specifically directs that the video tape of the scene of
the stop be submitted for review of the appellate court.
DATED this

f e? ^-^ic^^f^ygfemberT'

"JUDGE

I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of the

Le and

foregoing JUDGMENT was placed in the United States mail at Richfield, Utah,
with first-class postage thereon fully prepaid, on the
1992, addressed as follows:
Mr. Ronald J. Yengich
YENGICH, RICH, & XAIZ
Attorneys at Law
175 East 400 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Adult Probation and Parole
P. 0. Box 279
Richfield, Utah 84701

/7 -

day of November,

ADDENDUM III

COURT OF APPEALS ORDER
DENYING INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL

APR 211992
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo

%kA^c—
^ < / r k of the Court
Utah Court of Appeal*

S t a t e of Utah,
ORDER
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No. 920201-CA
v.
James Ronald Bello,
Defendant and Petitioner.

This matter is before the court pursuant to defendant's
petition for permission to appeal the trial court's denial of his
motion to suppress and plaintiff's motion to dismiss the petition
for interlocutory appeal as untimely.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant may have until 5:00
p.m., Friday, April 24, 1992, to file a written response to the
motion to dismiss. This court will rule on both the petition and
the motion to dismiss by 5:00 p.m., Monday, April 27, 1992.
Dated this
BY THE COURT:

^ f aday

of April, 1992

